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The Indian Organic Market A New Paradigm in Agriculture

The Indian Organic Market A New Paradigm in Agriculture
Ernest and Young, 2018
Agriculture has been practiced for centuries, and like any socio-economic or political
system that has stood the test of time, it is a product of the circumstances in which it
exists. In other words, it has undergone extreme changes to keep up with the opportunities,
requirements and challenges of the changing world. For thousands of years, agriculture
was practiced without the use of artificial substances. However, strides taken in science
and technology culminated in the intensification of conventional agriculture for increased
productivity. The increased use of synthetic substances met with fierce criticism and gave
birth to multiple organic farming movements across the world. Organic agriculture (OA) is
defined by the IFOAM as “a production system that sustains the health of soils, ecosystems
and people. It relies on ecological processes, biodiversity and cycles adapted to local
conditions, rather than the use of inputs with adverse effects. Organic Agriculture combines
tradition, innovation and science to benefit the shared environment and promote fair
relationships and a good quality of life for all involved.”(1) In other words, organic products
offer more social, economic, cultural, political and environmental benefits in the long run
than conventional products.
The categorization of a product as organic implies two main things: First, it is free from
toxic persistent pesticides, synthetic fertilizers, growth hormones and antibiotics or
genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Second, stringent organic cultivation standards
are followed, with respect to impact on soil, water and air. These value chain considerations
have resulted in organic products emerging as the perceived responsible choice among
consumers. Resultantly, the market for organic products has grown remarkably since the
1990s. The global market for organic products is growing faster (CAGR 16%) than the
global markets for conventional products (CAGR 10%) (7). This differential growth rate is
observed in multiple market segments, including food and beverages, textiles, health and
wellness, and beauty and personal care among others. The rapid growth of the organic
market can be attributed to various factors. The increasing emphasis on good health,
proliferation of consumption-related ailments, an increased awareness regarding the health
benefits of organic products among consumers, enhanced income levels and standard of
living, together with government initiatives aimed at promoting organic products are key
drivers of this exponential market expansion.
Organic farming is practiced with varying levels of success in 178 countries (2). However,
the North American and European Union regions (as single markets) generate the bulk
of the global sales. The global sales increased to US$89.7 billion in 2016 from US$7.9
billion in 2000 (2). Country wise, the top consumers of organic products are the US (US$43.1
billion), followed by Germany (US$10.5 billion) and France (US$7.5 billion) (2). The increase
in demand has led to a considerable increase in the area subject to organic management
techniques globally, surging from 11 million ha in 1999 to 57.8 million ha in 2016 (2). The
wild harvest and other non-agriculture organic collection area also increased to 39.9
million ha in 2016 from 4.1 million ha in 1999 (2). The three countries with the largest area
under organic cultivation are Australia (27.1 million ha), followed by Argentina (3.0 million
ha) and China (2.3 million ha) (2). The three countries with the largest wild harvest area for
organic products are Finland (11.6 million ha), followed by Zambia (6.7 million ha) and
India (4.2 million ha) (2). In addition to ranking third in wild harvest area, India also houses the highest number of organic producers globally with 835,000 organic farmers (2). It also ranks ninth in terms of
area under organic cultivation with 1.49 million ha (2).  Therefore, it occupies a robust position
in producing organic products, having already exported 1.35 million MT of certified organic
food products worth INR1,937 crore in 2015-16 (3). The exports are largely concentrated
around the US, Europe (EU), Canada, Japan and the West Asian markets. India is the largest
exporter of organic cotton worldwide. In the food market segment, oilseeds comprised half of India’s overall organic food export, followed by processed food products at 25% (4). The current Indian
organic market is estimated at INR 40,000 million and is likely to increase to INR100,000–120,000 million
by 2020 with a similar incremental trend in exports (5). Indian organic market has been progressing steadily
with CAGR of 25% as compared to 16% global growth rates (4, 2). However, despite the promising performance
in terms of exports, the local consumption of organic produce is still at a nascent stage with a market share
of less than 1% and per capita consumption at only EURO.1 (2)
The organic sector in India, albeit comparatively new, possesses inherent strengths that can be
leveraged, and the current context in which it thrives offers many opportunities that can be utilized. The
agricultural policy of India has gradually shifted from espousing a production-centric approach to a more
holistic approach. This approach, in addition to focusing on increased productivity, factors in climatic
considerations, nutritional concerns, environmental impact and standard of living of the stakeholders. The
shortcomings of conventional products in relation to these considerations create a lacuna, which is being
leveraged to promote organic agriculture. The Government has sanctioned several schemes to incentivize
organic farming and many state governments are creating individual policies for the same. In addition to
the Government’s increasing interest in the sector, private sector actors too have expressed their interest
by increasing investments in the sector. In addition to this, the demand for organic products is increasing
steadily as is the level of interest that Indian farmers have expressed in making the shift to organic farming.
Despite the enabling environment created by a culmination of the aforementioned factors, there exist
several challenges for all the stakeholders involved at every stage of the value chain. Producers of organic
products are continually struggling to optimize the scale of their operations while maintaining profitability.
This is primarily because of the gaps in the regulatory framework for organic products in India. In addition
to the procedural challenges pertaining to certification and quality assurance, the increasing costs of
inputs and the elongated conversion period from conventional to organic farming are a few of the key
challenges faced by the producers, most of whom are small or marginal farmers. The processors of organic
food products on the other hand, face significant resistance in the form of lack of adequate post harvest
facilities for organic products. Several measures need to be taken in order to avoid contamination and
cross-contamination of the produce and the infrastructural capabilities of the country often prove to be
inadequate. The marketing of organic produce comes with its own set of challenges related to global
competitiveness and differences in global and national quality standards. Although there has been a marked
improvement in the level of awareness regarding organic products, many consumers are unaware of its
benefits thereby providing no incentives for increased supply and resulting in organic products being priced
higher than their conventional variants.
An analysis of the strengths, opportunities, weaknesses and threats pertaining to the organic sector in
India calls for the development of a public-private partnership model that aids the sector in reaching its full
potential. A greater emphasis should be placed on the capacity building of stakeholders, easing access to
finance, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of all assets and processes as well as research and development
to help keep abreast with global progress in the sector. Additionally, there has emerged an urgent need for
infrastructural development and business climate reforms, reinvention of branding and marketing strategies
and entrepreneurship development.
This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the organic market in India with the aim of identifying the
key areas of intervention. It situates the Indian organic sector in the broader context of the global organic
sector while identifying trends, key drivers of growth, challenges and opportunities. The paper also puts
forth various solutions to the problems identified and in keeping in mind the global and national objectives
of environmental protection, food security and sustainability.
References

  1. “Cultivating Changes,” IFOAM website, https://www.ifoam.bio/en/organic-landmarks/definition-organic-agriculture accessed 16 March 2018
  2. The World of Organic Agriculture Statistics and Emerging Trend 2018, FiBL and IFOAM – Organics International FIBL & IFOAM website https://shop.fibl.org/CHen/mwdownloads/download/link/id/1093/?ref=1 accessed on March 10. 2018
  3. APEDA. http://apeda.gov.in/apedawebsite/organic/Organic_Products.htm accesses on March 10, 2018
  4. India Organic Food Market Forecast and Opportunities, 2020. August 2015. Tech Sci Research. https://www.techsciresearch.com/report/india-organicfood-market-forecast-and-opportunities-2020/449.html accesses on March 10, 2018
  5. Dilip Kr. Jha. India to treble export of organic products by 2020. Business Standard, April 27, 2017 website http://www.business-standard.com/article/markets/india-to-treble-export-of-organic-porducts-by-2020-117042600455_1.html accesses on March 10, 2018

Land Reforms Have Failed, Formalising Tenancy Only Option To Address Farm Distress’

New Delhi: In the last 10 months, farmers across the country have staged half a dozen large protests. On March 12, 2018, 35,000 farmers from all over Maharashtra walked 180 km over seven days to reach Mumbai and demand land titles, better prices for agricultural produce and farm loans. In July 2017, farmers from Tamil Nadu had protested in Delhi with skulls hanging from their necks to demand a loan waiver after the state was hit by a drought. In June 2017, Madhya Pradesh farmers had dumped milk, fruits and vegetables on the roads.
These protests are signs of an agrarian crisis: Farmers are stuck in a cycle of low returns, debt–and, often, death–at a time of increasingly uncertain weather. In a year to June 2013, 70% of Indian farm families reported having spent more than they had earned; and more than 52% said they were indebted and health costs were adding to their debt, IndiaSpend reported on June 27, 2017. In five years to 2015-16, real farm income per cultivator increased only 0.44% per year, our report of July 18, 2017 showed.
Of the issues driving down the country’s farm sector, tenancy is one of the foremost. An age-old, widespread practice in India, tenancy usually involves a landless farmer or holder of a small piece of land leasing land for cultivation. However, since the landlord is typically wealthier and more powerful, the practice is often exploitative, and has been the target of land reforms since Independence. Although tenancy was abolished or restricted in most states during the 1950s and 1960s, state government failed to redistribute land among the landless. Despite land ceiling drives, tenancy continued to grow covertly and informally, leaving tenants vulnerable.
In 2016, NITI Aayog, the policy think-tank of the Government of India, proposed a Model Agricultural Land Leasing Act, which aimed to “liberalize” the country’s tenancy system, arguing that it would actually benefit small farmers and improve the country’s agricultural productivity. Many states have framed laws on the lines of this model, which was drafted by NITI Aayog’s special cell on land policy headed by Tajamul Haque, a former chairperson of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices, former professor at the National Centre for Agricultural Economics & Policy Research, and ex-director of the National Institute of Rural Development. In an interview with IndiaSpend, Haque discussed the model law and how its implementation can benefit all stakeholders.
What does the Model Agricultural Land Leasing Act prescribe? How would it help tenants?
The model law is intended to liberalise and legalise the land leasing system in the country. Most of the states passed their tenancy laws in the ‘60s and ‘70s, which were highly restrictive. Some of the states banned leasing altogether. For instance, Kerala and Jammu and Kashmir do not allow land leasing. Other states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka and Himachal Pradesh allow only certain categories of people to give land on lease, for example the disabled, widow, minors, etc. Karnataka does not even allow these categories of people to lease out their land, the state only allowed people in services for instance: soldiers to lease their land.
In Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana and Gujarat, the governments have not banned leasing but at the same time, there are certain provisions in these states which make the option of leasing as good as prohibited. For example, in Andhra Pradesh, if an owner wants to end leasing and take the land from the tenant for personal cultivation, then the owner will have to leave at least 50% of the land with the tenant. Now, no owner would want to lease the land with these restrictions. Similarly, some states prescribe that if a tenant has been cultivating the land for more than the prescribed period of time, the tenant then has the right to occupy the land. The Zamindari Abolition Act of Uttar Pradesh [intended to remove an oppressive land-leasing system], for instance, also had a possession clause which said that if a tenant continued to cultivate a piece of land for over 12 years, s/he would be eligible to occupy that land. These clauses instill a fear in the owner’s mind against the leasing of land.
As a result, people let their land remain fallow, which affects the agricultural productivity of the country. Currently, 25 million hectares of land in the country are lying fallow largely because owners are not leasing them out due to restrictive clauses. If you assume that one hectare produces two tonnes of grain, with 25 million hectares lying fallow, the country is losing 50 million tonnes of grain.
So with the model land leasing act, we tried to remove all these restrictions. If an owner, out of lack of interest, lack of money to invest or other reasons, does not want to cultivate the land, s/he can choose to lease it out to some landless cultivator and benefit from the rent rather than keeping the land fallow for fear of losing it.
The tenant and the owner can mutually agree upon the rent and period of leasing and come up with a written contract, which should be attested by a person in a position of responsibility–such as the gram pradhan (village head), an advocate or a revenue officer–to make the leasing legal. They need not go to any revenue office or administrative department.
This formal signed document will do two things; first, it will assure the owner that the land is safe. Second, it will make a tenant-farmer eligible for government subsidies, insurance, disaster relief and credit schemes, because for the first time the tenant will have a document to prove that s/he is cultivating the land.
Tenant farmers have long been denied the right to even sell their farm produce in government agricultural produce markets where they can get better prices; they have to go through intermediaries and end up losing a lot of their profits. Now, if tenancy is legalized through a contract, the tenant farmer would be able to sell in these markets.
The model land leasing law, if applied, will not only help increase the income and productivity of tenant farmers’ land significantly, it will also help overall agricultural growth while helping the government double farmers’ income.
How many states have adopted the model law or amended their land laws on the lines of the model law?
Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh have amended their land laws. Uttarakhand has done it quite comprehensively, whereas Uttar Pradesh has just deleted the clause which allowed the tenant to occupy land after operating on it for more than 12 years. It has also included a range of people–business people, traders, people in services, members of legislative assembly or parliament–who would now be eligible to lease out their land along with the disabled. It is a big relief, but there is one thing they should not have done, which is prescribing a maximum lease period of three years. It should have been left for the owner to decide.
Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra have passed a new law on the lines of our model law. They have also added a penalty clause that if the tenant does not return the land after the lease period is over, s/he could be punished with imprisonment.
Would these formal leases have to be recorded with a government agency/department?
In our model law, we said the agreement between the tenant and the owner need not be recorded or registered with the revenue department; that would make the process complex. It also becomes a cause for fear in the owner’s head that their land is registered in revenue records under a lease and tomorrow a new law could come and prescribe that the tenant would have right over the land.
Hence, we suggested that the agreement be a simple written document attested by a person in a position of responsibility, for example the gram pradhan (village head), an advocate or a revenue officer. The government does not need to interfere. This document alone would be enough to make the lease formal and legal.
Once the period of the lease is over, the land will by default go back into the owner’s possession. Nobody needs to go to any office to take possession back.
Now, some states are prescribing the timeline of leases between three and six years, but that is not the correct way to do it. You see, if a tenant farmer is cultivating horticulture crops such as fruit, it could take more than a decade for the crop to be completely ready. Now, if the owner is willing to allow the tenant farmer to cultivate for a longer period of time, why are the states saying that it should be three years or six years? The owner and the tenant should be left to decide if the lease is for 10 years, or 20 years.
There are good examples also. Uttarakhand with its new law allows the leases to last for a maximum of 30 years, which is very reasonable.
If the government is not involved, do you not think it leaves a chance for financial exploitation of the tenant?
The chances of a tenant being financially exploited are very low. I do not think that the government protects the tenants, anyway. There are fair chances that if a tenant is going to a revenue officer to seek help, he would end up losing more money in bribes. The lesser the dependency on government bodies for this kind of contract, the better the chances of the contract being honoured by both the tenant and the owner.
In fact, if any such issue arises, we suggested that the gram panchayat (village council) should solve these amicably because the panchayat knows the reality about the land, the crop and the people involved.
Why do you think land redistribution has failed?
Out of the 5.1 million acres of land redistributed, about 21% is in West Bengal alone. Also, 60% of the total number of beneficiaries who received land in redistribution are in the state of West Bengal. So, West Bengal is actually the only state which, somewhat successfully, implemented the land ceiling and redistribution laws. Bihar also took some steps but all other big states like Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh failed in redistribution of land.
This is partly because in the past when the time was right, the state governments did not have the willpower to do it and the committed bureaucracy was not there. Another reason was that Jammu and Kashmir and Bihar implemented land ceiling laws along with laws abolishing intermediaries as early as the 1950s, but all the other states implemented these laws very late, in the 1960s and 1970s. By that time all the landlords were alert and had transferred their land under different names, which became a reason for the failure of land reforms in many states.
If we talk about the present scenario of land reforms in the country, the situation is not really good: nearly two lakh hectares of land–together comprising an area larger than Delhi–are under prolonged litigation, so unless this land is free, there is no hope. Currently there is only one state, West Bengal, which is still redistributing small chunks of land to the landless, but nothing is happening in any other Indian state.
On the one hand, 101.4 million–or 56.4%–rural households own no agricultural land and on the other, redistribution of land is failing. What could be the solution?
The model tenancy act will prove to be really helpful if implemented by states. The leasing act will improve landless poor people’s access to land. It will help small and marginal farmers to increase the size of their holdings.
Currently, the landless are not getting any land under most state governments’ land reforms, so if they at least make the leasing formal and legal, the landless would be enabled to access the land with a secure contract. This is the only hope, as of today, and will certainly help landless people improve their economic condition.
More than 50% of India’s workforce is still involved in agriculture with low levels of living and low levels of income. They are stuck in a poverty trap. Once this legal framework of leasing is implemented by all the states, we will see a big transformative change in the agriculture sector.
2017 study by the think-tank Global Land Alliance found that nearly one in five rural persons having a separate plot of agricultural land are worried about losing the land, and that tenants are twice as likely as owners to be worried about losing their home. What steps should the country take to make people feel secure about their property rights? Would digitization of land documents help?
If states legalise tenancy, it will really help in addressing the fear among owners and tenants of losing their land. The model land leasing act protects the proprietorship of the owner but at the same time provides tenure-related security to the tenant.
The second thing that India needs to do is to move away from presumptuous land titles. Currently, all the land registrations in India are registrations of deeds, these are not proof that you are the actual owner of the land which is registered in your name; it can be contested, causing a dispute. But under conclusive land titles, once the registration takes place the curtain falls, the land is yours, and it cannot be contested by another person. [In the Indian system, land ownership is presumptive. Currently, under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the right or title to land can be transferred or sold only through a registered document (registered under the Registration Act, 1908). The registration of land or property therefore refers to the registration of the transaction (“sale deed”), and not the land title. Therefore, a registered sale deed is not a government guarantee of land ownership; even bona fide property transactions may not always guarantee ownership as a previous transfer of the property could be challenged. The onus of verifying past ownership records is on the buyer, and not the registrar.]
But for India to assure conclusive land titles, it will have to amend a couple of laws. The Registration Act and the Indian Evidence Act [which contains rules for providing evidence in court] will have to be amended on priority. But unless two or more states request the central government, it cannot do that because land is a state subject.
Continuously updating land records, their digitization, followed by conclusive land titles should take care of the fear that Indian landowners have today.
Some 13.65% of India’s farm households–one in seven–were tenants, according to a 2013 National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) study. This implies there were 21.29 million tenant-farmers cultivating about 10.66 million hectares of land in 2012-13, as per a February 2018 study by Bhubaneshwar-based Center For Land Governance. The Agriculture Census 2010-11, on the contrary, states that 2.39% of farmers take land on lease for cultivation. Which data set shows the true picture and why is there so much difference?
The difference in the data is because of two primary reasons. Agriculture data does not present correct data on tenancy because it is based on land records. Since tenancy is not recorded, it is not fairly represented in the agriculture census data. NSSO data is based on household surveys. Someone physically goes to individual households to collect information, hence there is comparatively better representation of tenancy. But it may also not be the complete picture because due to tenancy being an illegal activity in many states, people will not reveal if they have informally leased land to cultivate.
(Tripathi is a principal correspondent with IndiaSpend.)
We welcome feedback. Please write to respond@indiaspend.org. We reserve the right to edit responses for language and grammar.

Point of no agri-returns Part 1: How India lost its historic agriculture recovery growth phase in just four years

https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/agriculture/how-india-lost-its-historic-agriculture-recovery-growth-phase-just-in-four-years-59480

Government reports say 2004-14 had the highest agriculture growth that has fast slipped back to near-zero growth despite normal monsoons and bumper yields

Last Updated: Monday 15 January 2018

Reports of severe agrarian distress have been pouring in from across the country. Credit: Surya Sen / CSE

Reports of severe agrarian distress have been pouring in from across the country. Credit: Surya Sen / CSE Reports of severe agrarian distress have been pouring in from across the country. Credit: Surya Sen / CSE
The National Democratic Alliance government is scrambling to rescue the agriculture sector from a crisis never seen before. On January 10, Prime Minister Narendra Modi met over 100 economists in a first ever such interaction. Agriculture, rural economy and unemployment dominated the discussions.
Modi’s promise of doubling farmers’ income by 2022 hung heavily over the meeting as reports of severe agrarian distress have been pouring in from across the country. Like in 2017, farmers dumping their produce for lack of fair price are already making headlines. And the government is about to present its last full budget and seek re-elections in just about 16 months.
Government data on economy shows a disturbing trend. In financial year 2017-18, agriculture would be growing at 2.1 per cent compared to 4.9 per cent in the previous year. This is not a good sign given the fact that India had a normal monsoon and was preceded by two below normal monsoons. Usually, after a drought, agriculture growth is higher due to low baseline level.
But, a crucial fact that got buried in the Modi-economists meeting is his own government’s series of rigorous reports on agriculture called “The Committee on Doubling Farmers’ Income” led by Ashok Dalwai.
The first report of the Dalwai committee using inputs and research of over 100 experts has pointed out that India’s agriculture is currently in a deep crisis. And it says so because during 2004-14 the country’s agriculture sector witnessed its highest ever growth phase. The report calls it the sector’s “recovery phase”; a term it defines as historic.
“The agricultural sector grew at the growth of around 4 per cent per year during 2004-05 to 2014-15 and the growth was quite impressive as compared to 2.6 per cent per annum during the previous decade (1995-96 to 2004-05),” says the report.
Politically, it is a not-so-comfortable a message for Modi. The best phase of agricultural growth coincided with the two tenures of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA I-II) government led by the Congress. Just before this, the low growth rate phase coincided with the NDA-I tenure when Atal Bihari Vajpayee was the prime minister.  NDA-I lost elections in 2004 unexpectedly and analysts attributed this to deepening rural crisis during that time.
More so, the report attributes this impressive agricultural growth more to government interventions than to other situational favourable conditions. “The most important factor for improved performance of agriculture, post 2004-05 period, has been the price received by the farmers caused by a number of underlying factors: hike given to MSP, increase in foodgrain procurement, increase in global agricultural prices and strong domestic demand for food,” it finds.
All recent farmers’ protests amid bumper harvests are for increasing the government’s minimum support price (MSP) and to force the NDA government to keep its electoral promise of a MSP plus 50 per cent extra to farmers. In the last three years, less than 10 per cent farmers could sell their produces in MSP, which is growing at pace seen during the 2004-14 period. Also, farmers across the country sold their bumper harvests at 30-50 per cent less than the MSP for all their produces during 2015-17.
The report just adds on to this worry of Modi. It sees the recent farmers’ protests as an indication of deepening crisis in agriculture sector post the “recovery phase”.
“At the basic level, agriculture when defined as an enterprise comprises two segments–production and post-production. The success of production as of now amounts to half success, and is therefore, not sustainable. Recent agitations of farmers (June-July 2017) in certain parts of the country demanding higher prices on their produce following record output or scenes of farmers dumping tractor loads of tomatoes and onions onto the roads or emptying canisters of milk into drains exemplify neglect of other half segment of agriculture.”
Modi government’s performance in agriculture has been lackluster. In 2015-16, agriculture contributed 17.4 per cent to India’s GDP, which was 18.3 per cent in 2013-14, the year before he came to power. In 2014-15, agriculture reported negative growth at -0.2 per cent. Despite this low base, next year it reported 1.2 per cent growth. And in 2016-17, it was estimated to be 4.1 per cent. At an average, the growth in the last four years is around 2 per cent.
The last three years are also known for restrictions on livestock trade. While government fiddled with this sector, the agrarian crisis deepened. The Dalwai Committee Report points out that the biggest contributor to the agricultural growth in 2004-14 was livestock sector, which has never reported a negative growth in the last 35 years. “Thus, the livestock sector is likely to emerge as engine of growth of agricultural sector and can be relied upon for risk mitigation and minimising the losses to the farmers in case of even worst outcomes from others sub-sectors. Previous studies have unanimously reported that livestock as the best insurance against agrarian distress as the sector is the source of sustained income and generates income more frequently than the crop sector,” the report says. And it is known by this time that across north India, due to the restrictions and raids from cow protection groups, livestock trade and prices have crashed.

There are wild speculations that the NDA-II’s last full budget would be all about rural and agriculture sectors. But will it turn around the fate of farmers and rural Indians in just a year? More pertinently, will it reap an electoral harvest for Modi?

The current agrarian crisis is too deep-rooted to witness an instant recovery through a farmer-friendly budget. Let’s look at the income of a farmer in India. During the “recovery phase” itself, a member of an agricultural household earned around Rs 214/month. But his/her expenditure was about Rs 207. In simple term, a member had a disposal income of just Rs 7/month. Since 2015, India has witnessed two major droughts, some 600 incidents of crop losses due to unseasonal rains and other related incidents, and finally in two years of bumper harvests prices for their produces crashed majorly. It means, a farmer is now without any base capital to invest, and nor has he the capacity to take the risk of going back to agriculture. This has added to the crisis that manifests in extreme resentments.
For the first time in recent history, relatively rich farmers were out on the streets protesting for better price for their produce. The Dalwai committee report shows that the government’s move to import foodgrains to curb inflation has majorly distorted the market against the domestic farmers. India’s export of agricultural produces has dipped. It recorded more than five times growth during 2004-2014: from Rs 50,000 crore to Rs 260,000 crore. In a year it dipped to Rs 210,000 crore in 2015-16, or a market potential loss of Rs 50,000 crore.
On the other hand, agricultural import has reported constant growth. It was Rs 30,000 crore in 2004-5, which increased to Rs 90,000 crore in 2013-14, the last year of the UPA-II government. In 2015-16, it reached to Rs 150,000 crore.
Close to 22 per cent of farmers subsist below the poverty line. The dip in farmers’ income, while giving a call for doubling income, shouldn’t be just another grand plan for a “new India”, because agricultural growth critically decides poverty reduction. According to historic data, agricultural growth has much more impact on poverty reduction than any other activity like industrial growth. So, it is time government got its focus back into the factors that once ensured this recovery phase.

Wooing the farmer

http://www.india-seminar.com/2018/701/701_a_gulati_&_r_roy.htm
ASHOK GULATI and RANJANA ROY
THE prime minister of India made a clarion call to double farmers’ incomes by 2022 at a kisan rally in Bareilly on 28 February 2016. This statement assumed an official tone when the finance minister recalled it in his budget speech of financial year 2016-17 (FY17) and then again in FY18. It was followed by setting up a committee for Doubling Farmers’ Income (DFI) under the chairmanship of Ashok Dalwai, then additional secretary in the Union Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare (MoA and FW). The committee is reported to have prepared a 14 volume report detailing the strategic design for DFI by 2022. Currently, five volumes of this report on DFI have been uploaded on the MoA & FW website.
In the meantime, the prime minister has given another clarion call on 26 November 2017 during his address to the nation (Mann ki Baat), and that is: halving urea consumption (HUC) by 2022. It is not yet comprehensible whether this is a well researched and thought out policy goal of the current government, and whether it will be backed by another expert committee to delineate its strategic design on how to achieve it, or just a spontaneous and casual statement expressing Narendra Modi’s ‘wish dream’. But this statement about HUC by 2022 has sent the entire urea industry into a tizzy guessing what might follow in terms of urea policy in the months to come.
At one level, both clarion calls coming from the prime minister – of DFI and HUC by 2022 – convey his good intentions and concerns about Indian agriculture and farmers in particular. But, at another level, if not backed by realistic strategic plans to achieve them, such statements can also cause confusion and disappointment among important stakeholders in Indian agriculture.
In this paper, we undertake a reality check about the twin clarion calls of the PM to DFI and HUC by 2022. We do this by digging a little deeper into the current status of farmers’ incomes and urea consumption in the country and how they have evolved during the last 15 years or so, and the challenges that lie ahead if one is to achieve these twin goals in the next five years. Subsequently, the paper analyses trends and composition of farmers’ income during 2002-12, and trends in profitability of crops in some major producing states during 2012-17. This is followed by a discussion of trends in production, imports and consumption of fertilizers, especially urea, and the impact of recent policy initiatives, especially neem coating of urea (NCU) and soil health cards (SHC), on urea consumption. Then we look at the possible association between farm profitability and fertilizer consumption, and finally, based on this analysis, offer our final assessment and policy suggestions which hopefully may contribute towards moving in the direction of augmenting farmers’ incomes and reducing urea consumption.
The Dalwai Committee on DFI clearly states that the objective of the government is to double farmers’ incomes in real terms by 2022. Also, that the period over which this has to be achieved is seven years (2016-17 to 2022-23), not five as is repeated in many political statements. Finally that realizing the objective would require farmers’ real incomes to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 10.4% per annum in real terms. This is a much needed clarification if one has to move in this direction in any serious manner.
In this context, it may be worth pointing out that the NSSO situation assessment survey releases data on average annual income of agricultural households from various sources every 10 years. Agri-households’ income comprises of four components: (a) cultivation of crops; (b) rearing livestock; (c) wages and salaries; and (d) non-farm business. The results of the NSSO situation assessment surveys show that over the period 2002-03 to 2012-13 agri-households real incomes increased at CAGR of 3.56% (say 3.6) per annum only, while the nominal incomes increased by 11.8% per annum (Figure 1).
In absolute terms, the monthly income of an average agri-household hovered around Rs 6426 in 2012-13. Expectedly it was lower for small and marginal farmers. However, there is a wide variation in CAGR of real incomes across states. Odisha registered the highest CAGR growth of 8.7% in real incomes of agri-households, followed by Haryana (7.8%), Rajasthan (7.5%) and Andhra Pradesh (6.3%). The worst performers were West Bengal (-0.7%), Bihar (-0.1%) and Uttarakhand (-3.0%) with an absolute decline in the real incomes of agri-households.
As indicated earlier, there are four components of farmers’ incomes: income from crop cultivation, farming animals, wages and salaries, and non-farm business. In this context, it is interesting to observe that during 2002-03 to 2012-13, the share of income from crop cultivation and farming of animals increased from 50% to 60% while the share of wages and salaries declined from 39% to 32%. Note that the Dalwai Committee report on DFI by 2022 aims to raise the share of crop cultivation and animal husbandry to 69% by 2022-23 (in fact at one place it mentions taking it to as high as 80%).
Three major questions arise from these observations. Given that during 2002-03 to 2012-13, farmers’ incomes grew by just 3.6% per annum in real terms, call it business as usual (BAU) scenario, how do policy makers aim to achieve a double digit growth rate of 10.4% per annum, almost a threefold jump, to double farmers’ real incomes by 2022-23? Given that a CAGR of 10.4% has never been achieved, even for the whole economy, for any seven years at a stretch in our history, how can one dream of achieving that for farmers’ real incomes?
The Dalwai Committee estimated that in order to achieve CAGR of 10.4%, an additional investment of Rs 6.4 lakh crore at 2011-12 prices is needed for agriculture. Is it feasible for the government to pump in this additional investment in/for agriculture, especially given the widespread culture of subsidies and loan wavers?
Even if this extra investment is generated and double digit (10.4%) growth in farmers’ incomes achieved, how will the huge agri-surplus produce be absorbed? Is there enough demand in the country for say a threefold increase in farm output? Is there adequate marketing and storage infrastructure to keep it in place? Or will it be exported? Will we be sufficiently competitive and can the global markets absorb it?
As per the DFI report, the large share of income will come from crop and animal husbandry; therefore, it is important to analyse the present situation of Indian agriculture and measure the challenges faced by the sector.
In the last three years, the sector grew at a mere 1.8% per annum (2014-15 to 2016-17), less than half of what we achieved during 2011-12 to 2013-14. Deficient rainfall was a major reason for poor performance during 2014-15 and 2015-16. But though 2016-17 experienced normal rainfall and there were bumper harvests, yet farmers experienced a severe loss due to a collapse in agri-prices. It is higher return on farming operations rather than higher productivity that motivates farmers to invest more in agriculture, which is what will raise agri-GSDP.
Next we look at net profitability of major crops produced in India during recent years for which data are available. Profitability is calculated by subtracting per hectare cost (C2) from gross value of output per hectare. The C2 cost includes the paid out costs by farmers plus imputed rental costs of owned land, imputed interest on owned capital and imputed value of family labour employed as estimated by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics of MoA & FW and used by the Commission for Agriculture Costs and Prices (CACP) in recommending minimum support prices (MSP) for these crops. It may also be worth recalling that in its election manifesto in 2014 the BJP had promised to raise profitability to 50% over cost (C2), which has been the demand of many farmer organizations – popularly known as the Swaminathan formula.
But the reality about crop profitability on the ground is quite different. Profitability of important crops in major producing states has actually declined from an already low level. We have calculated a weighted average profitability of major crops from state level profitability by using share of state in total cropped area under that crop. The uncomfortable truth is that net profit margin in almost all major agricultural commodities covered here has declined in recent years. Farmers cultivating paddy, maize, cotton, soybean and potato have all experienced loss in 2014-15 compared to 2012-13 and 2013-14. (Figure 2)
It may be noted that actual profitability over cost (C2) is available from Government of India (GoI) data only up to 2014-15. There is normally a lag of two to three years before one can hope to get actual numbers from 2015-17 from GoI sources. However, one can use the projected costs as calculated by CACP for their MSP calculations, and look at the market prices of those crops at harvest time in major states to get an idea of profitability of major crops in 2016 and 2017. This is what is attempted below. Actual market prices are obtained by taking an average of major mandi prices of the largest producing states and compared with projected costs as derived by CACP. The results of major kharif crops for the season 2016-17 and 2017-18 are presented in Figure 3.
Falling crop profitability since the NDA government took charge in May 2014 is appalling and should serve as a wake-up call. This is also reflected in the overall agri-GDP tumbling down from about 4% in the last three years of the UPA II government to 1.8% in the first three years of NDA rule. Even including 2017-18, the performance of agriculture GDP under four years of the Modi government may turn out to be just 2%. These facts, based on government data, indicate that most likely, under a BAU scenario, the dream of doubling real incomes of farmers by 2022 remains a chimera. But nevertheless there are still a wide range of opportunities available which can help augment farmers’ incomes, if not double them by 2022. But, can we achieve that by cutting down urea consumption by half by 2022? That’s a big challenge which we take up next.Figure 3 clearly shows that farmers producing kharif crops suffered huge losses, especially in kharif 2017. No wonder, farmer agitations are on an increase and even the government realizes that farm distress is severe.
India has come a long way with an increase in foodgrain production from 52 million tonnes in 1951-52 to 276 million tonnes in 2016-17. The green revolution was a result of high yielding variety seeds, irrigation and fertilizer usage and remunerative prices through MSP policy. Given limited cultivable land, enhanced fertilizer use played a crucial role in increasing crop yields in the years to follow. However, the usage of N, P and K, the three main fertilizer nutrients, has not been very balanced. The GoI policy of promoting use of chemical fertilizers by heavily subsidizing them, and the very low prices of urea have resulted in imbalanced use of nutrients (Nitrogenous, Phosphatic and Potassic).

The price of DAP (Diammonium Phosphate) has for a long time been higher than that of urea. But before decontrol of P&K fertilizers, the MRP of MOP (Muriate of Potash) used to be lower than that of urea. The price of both DAP and MOP became higher than urea after that. After 2010-11, the prices of DAP and MOP have undergone large changes whereas for 15 years now the price of urea has remained almost at the same level (the increase in urea price is marginal – from Rs 4600/mt in 2000-01 to Rs 5360/mt in 2014-15). In comparison, the MRP of DAP and MOP increased manifold.The generally conceived ideal ratio of NPK use is 4:2:1, although it will differ from state to state and even within a state across many districts. The ratio improved in 2009-10 (4.3:2:1). But after the adoption of nutrient based subsidy (NBS) scheme for P and K fertilizers in 2010, prices of these nutrient based fertilizers increased enormously even as urea prices remained low. The imbalance kept increasing after that. Urea prices are the lowest in India compared to our neighbouring countries. This has led to the misuse of urea – its diversion to non-agricultural uses as well as to neighbouring countries.

The 11th plan gave importance to setting up of soil testing laboratories. The prime minister launched the Soil Health Card Scheme on 19 February 2015. An outlay of Rs 585.54 crore was approved for the 12th plan period. In the period of 2014-17, 460 laboratories were sanctioned. The scheme aims to measure the nutrient status of soil and recommend step for improved and sustainable soil health and fertility status. Soil samples are to be drawn from a grid of 2.5 ha in irrigated area and 10 ha in rain-fed area with the help of GPS tools and revenue maps. The state government will refer 1% of all the samples in a year to a ‘referral laboratory’ to analyse and certify the results of the primary laboratory. In cycle I and II respectively, 9.89 crore and 0.55 crore SHCs have been distributed.In order to improve the situation, some steps were undertaken. Two of them are worth mentioning : (i) introduction of Soil Health Cards (SHCs); and (ii) neem coating of Urea (NCU).
Nitrogen use efficiency (NUE) is very low in India. Tests (mostly on paddy and wheat) have shown that neem coated urea (NCU) increases efficiency by around 10%. It is expected to save fertilizer subsidy by Rs 6500 crore. The upper limit of NCU (20% in June 2008) was increased to 35% in January 2011 and again to 75% in March 2015. In May 2015, NCU was made mandatory for 100% of the production. This was also ex-tended to imported urea from 1 December 2015.
Fertilizer subsidy has helped increase consumption of urea from 19.2 mmt in 2000-01 to 29.6 mmt in 2016-17. Some studies claim that NCU is the main driver behind stagnating or marginally falling urea consumption in 2016-17, over say 2013-14. But, it is equally likely that crashing crop prices and consequently falling farmers’ profitability might have also led to fall in fertilizer consumption (Figure 6). It is, however, clear that so far neither the SHCs nor NCU have been able to make a major dent in reducing consumption of urea. How the Modi government expects to cut it to half by 2022 is not only puzzling but confusing, unless it comes up with some bold, ‘out of box thinking’ policy decisions. In the present scenario, with even SHCs and NCU, there does not seem to be any possibility of cutting down the urea consumption to say 15 mmt (by half) by 2022.
Regressing profitability (over A2 cost) on Fertilizer ConsumptionThe big question is whether the Modi government can achieve the twin objectives of simultaneously doubling farmers’ incomes and halving urea consumption by 2022. In order to better understand this issue, we have tried to look at the relationship between crop profitability and fertilizer consumption. For this, we have estimated year wise profitability (Rs/ha) at constant prices (with 2011-12 prices as base) and regressed it over fertilizer consumption per ha. We pooled the data for major crops (paddy, wheat, cotton, rapeseed-mustard, and sugarcane) and their major producing states, over the three years. In total, we had 75 observations and we ran the regression in log form. The results are as given below:
Ln_profit =                6.23***                      + 0.82
Ln_Fertilizer***
(7.49)                        (10.93)
Adj R square= 0.43
N=75; *** means significant at 1%.
 
The log regression coefficients were highly significant (at 1% level) statistically. The equation implied that 10% increase in fertilizer consumption is associated with 8.2% increase in farm profitability over cost A2 (paid out costs). Since it was a cross-section and time series pooled data, Adjusted R-square does not matter much. It is the statistical significance of the coefficients generated, which is of relevance. Figure 7 also shows this relation between fertilizer consumption and crop profitability (over cost A2, at constant prices).
So, is the PM’s call for halving urea consumption by 2022 achievable and is it consistent with the goal of doubling farmers’ income? In 1992-93, when India’s urea consumption was about half of its current levels, paddy and wheat productivity levels were 38% and 33% lower compared to those in 2015-16. Does it mean that in case of halving urea consumption by 2022, GoI is ready to accept substantially lower yields of paddy and wheat, or is there a special strategy to keep the yields high and rising while reducing urea consumption by half? In our view, with a growing population and limited arable land, there will be tremendous pressure to raise productivity of rice and wheat, and for that urea consumption is likely to increase unless some drastic measures and alternative strategy are put in place.
Consequently, where do we stand in terms of the twin objectives of doubling farmers’ incomes (DFI) and halving urea consumption (HUC) by 2022? In our opinion, this is almost an impossible task under the business as usual scenario. However, substantial progress can be made in that direction provided that the government is willing to take some bold decisions. Very briefly, the foremost job of the government should be to set the incentives for farmers right. This means ‘getting markets right’. It calls for reforms in APMC and Essential Commodities Act of 1955, enabling a free play of markets and allowing the private sector to hold stocks and export without restrictions. The interests of the poor consumers can be taken care of by targeted interventions though direct cash transfers. If incentives can be set right, the next challenge will be to attract investments in and for agriculture. Institutional reforms, especially enabling land lease, can help to further augment farmers’ incomes. Above all, it is continuous innovations in production and marketing of produce, fetching the best price, that will help to augment farmers’ incomes.
On urea consumption, there is some scope for reduction, especially by correcting the imbalanced use of N, P and K, and by stopping its diversion to non-agri uses as well as to neighbouring countries. To achieve all this, only one policy needs to be followed – direct benefit transfer to farmers’ account the money equivalent to current levels of subsidy and set the fertilizer pricing and markets totally free. That would not only enthuse the fertilizer industry to innovate and give the best products to farmers, but also remove the wrong signals of under pricing of urea and thus correct its imbalanced use, and stop the diversions of urea to other uses and across borders. Opening millions of bank accounts under Jan Dhan Yojana in a record breaking time was a great step by the Modi government. But it can become a real game changer only when these accounts are used for direct benefit transfer of food and fertilizer subsidies. The rest will all follow. Can the Modi government bite the bullet? Only time will show.
References:

  1. Chand, Doubling Farmers’ Income: Rationale, Strategy, Prospects and Action Plan; Niti Policy Paper No.1/2017, National Institute for Transformation India, Government of India, New Delhi.
  2. Fan, A. Gulati and S. Thorat, ‘Investment, Subsidies, and Pro-Poor Growth in Rural India. IFPRI Discussion Papers 716, International Food Policy Research Institute, 2007.

Government of India, Report of the Committee on Doubling Farmers’ Income, Volume II, Status of Farmers’ Income: Strategies for Accelerated Growth, Department of Agriculture, Cooperation and Farmers Welfare, Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, New Delhi, 2017.
Government of India, Agricultural Statistics at a Glance, Department of Agriculture, Cooperation and Farmers Welfare, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, New Delhi, 2016.
Government of India, Key Indicators of Situation of Agricultural Household in India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, National Sample Survey Organization 70th Round (January-December 2013), Kolkata, 2014.

  1. Gulati and S. Narayanan,The Subsidy Syndrome in Indian Agriculture. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2003.
  2. Gulati and P. Banerjee, Rationalising Fertiliser Subsidy in India: Key Issues and Policy Options, Working Paper 307, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), New Delhi, 2015.
  3. Gulati and S Saini, Making Indian Agriculture Profitable, Productive and Sustainable, Department of Economic and Analysis and Research, Mumbai, 2017.
  4. Gulati, P. Rajkhowa and P. Sharma, Making Rapid Stride – Agriculture in Madhya Pradesh: Sources, Drivers and Policy Lessons, Working Paper 339, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), New Delhi, 2017.
  5. Gulati, R. Roy and S. Hussain, Getting Punjab Agriculture Back on High Growth Path: Sources, Drivers and Policy Lessons, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), New Delhi, 2017.
  6. Hussain and A. Gulati, ‘A Sketchy Road-map’,Indian Express, 25 September 2017. http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/ columns/a-sketchy-roadmap-niti-aayog-three-year-action-agenda-tyaa-4859507/
  7. Gulati and P. Terway, ‘From Plate to Plough: Why Bumper Harvests Spell Doom’,Indian Express, 19 June 2017.

http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/madhya-pradesh-maharashtra-farmers-protest-loan-waiver-from-plate-to-plough-why-bumper-harvests-spell-doom-agriculture-in-modi-government-4710585/
Websites
http://eands.dacnet.nic.in/
http://www.mospi.gov.in/
http://agmarknet.gov.in/

Dairy sector to grow at 15% CAGR till 2020 to Rs 9.4 trillion: Report

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/agriculture/dairy-sector-to-grow-at-15-cagr-till-2020-to-rs-9-4-trillion-report/articleshow/62105938.cms

Further, India is expected to emerge as the largest dairy producer by 2020, the report said.

Dec 17, 2017, 04.58 PM IST
MUMBAI: India’s dairy industry is expected to maintain 15 per cent compounded annual growth (CAGR) over 2016-20, and attain value of Rs 9.4 trillion on rising consumerism, a report said.
“India’s dairy industry is worth Rs 5.4 trillion by value, having grown at 15 per cent CAGR during 2010-16. Going ahead, the dairy industry is expected to maintain 15 per cent CAGR over 2016-20, and attain value of Rs 9.4 trillion on rising consumerism,”  said in a report
India has progressed from being deficient in milk production at 20 million MT in 1970 to becoming the world’s largest milk producer at 160 million MT, accounting for 18.5 per cent of global milk production.
Further, India is expected to emerge as the largest dairy producer by 2020, the report said.
The Union government implemented the Central Scheme National Dairy Plan – Phase 1 during 2012-17 to improve productivity of dairy cooperatives through several input activities. Investments by private players in the domestic dairy sector is also expected to further augment milk productivity, it explained.
Going ahead, India’s milk production is expected to outperform global production and grow at a similar 4.2 per cent CAGR to 185 million MT per annum, and surpass EU to emerge the largest dairy producer by 2020.
Interestingly, the country’s per capita milk consumption has also been increasing at 3 per cent CAGR as compared to 1 per cent CAGR globally.
The report notes that there is huge scope for India’s per capita milk consumption to spurt led by growth in value-added products (VADP), which is at 34 per cent of industry versus 86 per cent for the global mature markets like EU, the report said.
India has a potential of 15-30 per cent plus growth in VADP like cheese, whey, UHT milk over next few years, it added.
Led by rising disposable income, and growing consumer preference for branded and value-added milk and milk products, investments by organised players also in the sector has been on the rise.
The report pointed out that other top milk producing geographies like EU, USA, China, Pakistan are expected to grow their production volumes at 2 per cent growth over 2020, which is lower than India’s growth estimates.

India’s farms report income greater than our GDP! Target them in the war on black money

The opposition is baying for the government’s blood over demonetisation and GST. The first is done and over with. But its effects are not yet over. The second has been modified to assuage large sections of the population.

Source: India’s farms report income greater than our GDP! Target them in the war on black money

India’s farms report income greater than our GDP! Target them in the war on black money

https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/economy/indias-farms-report-income-greater-than-our-gdp-target-them-in-the-war-on-black-money-2437801.html

The opposition is baying for the government’s blood over demonetisation and GST. The first is done and over with. But its effects are not yet over. The second has been modified to assuage large sections of the population.

RN BHASKARNOVEMBER 14, 2017 / 12:55 PM IST

RN Bhaskar

The opposition is baying for the government’s blood over demonetisation and GST. The first is done and over with. But its effects are not yet over. The second has been modified to assuage large sections of the population.

The government continues to insist that demonetisation will help curb black money. Maybe it will. The money that has been put into bank accounts (since very few of high value notes got ‘impounded’ or cancelled by the government) will help the government track down accounts which saw a surge in deposits. That will enable the tax authorities to track down the sources of these deposits.

According to media reports, attributed to highly placed tax authorities, more than Rs 2 lakh was deposited in over 60 lakh bank accounts post-demonetisation. The total amount involved is over Rs 7.34 lakh crore. These accounts are now under scrutiny.

8 lakh or 60 lakh?

That may be so.  However, there are good reasons to believe that the Finance Ministry could haul up bigger fish by just scrutinizing some 8 lakh accounts, instead of pursuing 60 lakh accounts.

These are the people who submitted agricultural income tax returns in 2011-2013 (see chart alongside). Watch the table closely.  The total number of returns filed and which showed agricultural income surged from 425,085 in 2011, to 656,944 in 2011.  This number climbed further in 2012 to 812,426 in 2012.

Capture

But more astonishing is the amount of money involved. Collectively, the amount claimed as agricultural income was Rs 84,742 crore (average amount per assessee Rs 19.lakh) in 2010. If that made you gasp, watch the amount declared for 2011. It jumped to (hold your breath) Rs 19,971,098 crore (Rs 3,040 lakh average per assessee) in 2011. It did not stop at this level. It climbed further to Rs 67,431,358 crore (average Rs 8,300 lakh) in 2012.

The collective amount for the three years comes to an astounding Rs 86,486,197 crore (Rs 865 lakh crore). It is astounding, because the GVA (gross value added) for the country was only Rs 8,546,552 crore, Rs 9,084,369 crore and Rs 9,727,490 for 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively. The total GVA for the three years together comes to Rs 27,358,411 crore.

What this means is that the total agricultural income filed with the IT authorities was three times the total GVA for the three years. If only 2011 and 2012 are taken into account, agricultural income declared was almost 5 times the GVA for those two years. Preposterous! That effectively means that agricultural income was even greater than India’s GDP or GVA! Unbelievable!

But that is what the numbers say. Some taxmen tried to pass this off as data-entry errors. But that is implausible. This is because any income over Rs 20 lakh has to be fed into the income tax servers directly by the assessees. If the figures are wrong, the assessees should be hauled up and penalised for wrongful entries. The entries should then be cancelled and treated as null and void. Else, they should be prosecuted and fined for concealment of income. Neither has happened. The Finance Ministry is silent about this. So are the income tax authorities.

In fact, the income tax on such declarations could be large enough to account for almost 100 years of total taxes collected. That could actually make Prime Minister Modi’s plan for giving money back to tax payers a reality.

The genesis

The genesis of these discoveries lies in a series of accidents. The first figure that emerged was a mind-boggling amount of Rs 2,000 lakh crore. This was almost two and a half times the Rs 865 lakh crore given in the table alongside. This figure emerged in an affidavit filed by a retired Income Tax (IT) officer — Vijay Sharma.

He had filed an RTI (Right to Information) request with the income tax department for the amounts declared as agricultural income. He claimed that he had indicated an exponential increase in agricultural income from 2004 to 2013, touching a total of almost Rs 2,000 lakh crore for 6.57 lakh individual assessees in 2011. He then asked for the top 100 names of the people who had filed such returns.

His RTI request was denied. He then decided to file a public interest litigation (PIL) petition with the Patna High Court in Bihar. This matter was duly reported by media in March 2016. The court was supposed to hear the petition in April in that year itself. But the courts, too, have been silent on this matter.

Almost simultaneously, the income tax department gave out a different set of figures (see table 1) which was dutifully reported by the media.

At the same time, thanks to the PIL before Patna High Court, the CBDT – on 10 March 2016 — sent out a circular to all its officers to verify details (LETTER F.NO.DGIT(S)/DIT(S)-3/AST/PIL MATTER/AGRICULTURAL INCOME/97/2015-16) A copy of this letter can be downloaded here. It confirmed that there had been a surge in agricultural-income returns. It also attempts to suggest a way to wriggle out of this mess. 

And this brings us back to demonetisation. Remember, demonetisation involved just Rs 15.4 lakh crore.  The total currency in circulation is under Rs 20 lakh crore.  And Rs 865 lakh crore was many times these levels.

Why agricultural income?

Of course, the one question that automatically arises is – why is the focus on agricultural income so crucial?  The reason is simple.  Agricultural income is tax exempt, provided it is declared as agricultural income with the tax authorities.  That has given rise to several theories. Someone possibly tipped off some of the most powerful people in India during 2010.  Maybe, there was an amnesty scheme round the corner. Maybe, there was an assurance that no questions would be asked.  But that is all pure speculation. But the numbers that appeared in the media, and through the tax authorities could not have been speculation.  One cannot imagine the entire country getting into a speculative mood simultaneously, all of a sudden.

The tax-free nature of agricultural income has made this the favourite method many politicians are said to use to convert their illegally gotten wealth into legitimate income.  That is why agriculture is often referred to as a laundromat. Some of the politicians have disclosed figures that defy reasoning.  Even if the most productive field were to be used for growing the most lucrative crop, incomes of those levels would just not be possible.

Sadly, the income tax department – and the Finance Ministry – have kept silent on scrutinizing these returns. More painfully, even the judiciary has not asked questions.  Had it done so, the PIL filed by Sharma would have been heard, and the truth would have come out. One way or the other, the ghost of huge agricultural incomes would have been put to rest.

Strangely, even the opposition parties have chosen to stay quiet about this.

I call this a collusive silence. Nothing makes sense for now.

So we return to the question everyone has been asking. Will demonetisation root out black money? Maybe, yes.  But only if the problem of agricultural income is addressed first.(The author is Consulting Editor with Moneycontrol)

The Downside of Repeated Debt Waivers

The Downside of Repeated Debt Waivers

Debt waivers are supposed to help farmers make agricultural investments, repay future debts and tackle any other situation. But the history of waivers in India tells a different tale.

Credit: PTI

Credit: PTI

India is facing an agrarian crisis. There is no doubt that the majority of the small and marginal farmers are indebted. According to the Reserve Bank of India, the amount of outstanding loans given out for agricultural and allied activities by the regional rural banks has increased from Rs 1.80 billion in 1980-81 to Rs 1329.67 billion in 2015-16. According to the 2009 India Human Development Survey, the average outstanding loan for a household was above Rs 50,000. The most popular and yet most debated public policy response to tackle this problem of spiraling farm debts in India has been debt waiver programs.
The theoretical argument in support of debt waiver policies originated in the macroeconomic context of debt relief programs for low income countries. For instance, Bolivia received on average $614 million in foreign aid per year between 1998 and 2002 towards debt relief. These numbers went up further in recent years. Sachs, in his 1989 work, argues that a very high level of outstanding debt reduces the incentive for the debtor to exert effort to repay, a concept captured by the Debt Lafer Curve. Krugman shows that in such a situation a policy of debt forgiveness could induce the optimal level of effort from the debtor and maximise repayment. A similar logic can be borrowed in a microeconomic setting like the agricultural loan waivers. Farmers who run into huge debts, due to uncertainties associated with agriculture, are less likely to be able to come out of the debt trap without any help from outside. Debt waivers are supposed to help the farmer come out of the unforeseen situation, make agricultural investments and be able to repay future debts. The problem arises though, when we consider the specific history of farm loans waivers in India.
A typical agricultural loan contract in India uses land as collateral, which are freed once the loans are repaid. Loan waivers protect households from confiscation of their land by credit institutions in case of default. Effectively, the practice of repeated loan waivers, announced in the wake of state level elections, have contributed towards shaping an expectation among farmers about government intervention to free up their collateral in case of default. This has led to a loss of credibility in the enforcement of loan contracts between the farmers and the banks. The hope for future loan waivers is likely to have generated incentives among farmers to utilise agricultural loans for unproductive purposes and adversely affect agricultural investments.
While the debate regarding efficacy of loan waivers has gained momentum in recent times, agricultural loan waiver programs have been around for a while in India. In 1990, Prime Minister V.P. Singh announced a waiver of up to Rs 10,000 for agricultural loans per household. It cost the government Rs 100 billion to complete the waiver and it took the banks, involved in the scheme, nine years to recover the funds from the government. In the same year, the then chief minister of Haryana, Devi Lal, announced a Rs 2275 million waiver for both cooperative and commercial bank loans. In 2008, the UPA government announced one of the largest debt waiver schemes in the history of India, the Agricultural Debt Waiver and Debt Relief Scheme (ADWDRS). ADWDRS became the most prominent waiver program, at least partly because of its size – a massive Rs 716 billion. It also served as a precursor to the series of state level waiver schemes that followed. In November 2011, the Samajwadi Party government announced a debt waiver of Rs 17.20 billion for Uttar Pradesh, while the Andhra Pradesh (TDP party) and Telengana (TRS party) governments came up with their own waiver packages of Rs 240 billion and Rs 170 billion respectively in 2014-15. In 2016, the AIDMK party announced its waiver package of Rs 57.8 billion for Tamil Nadu as part of its election manifesto. Despite having the second largest fiscal deficit last year, when the BJP won the elections in UP, the state once again had a debt waiver package ready to be implemented. The BJP’s electoral manifesto had committed to write off loans of small and marginal farmers, which would approximately cost the government Rs 370 billion. The states of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat are also in the pipeline to announce their own loan waiver packages, taking the cumulative loan waiver amount in the year 2016-17 to approximately Rs 3200 billion, equivalent to 2.6% of the country’s GDP.
Despite large sums of money being spent on these programs, little is known about their effectiveness. Are they really helping the farmer increase their productivity and pull them out of the debt trap?
Uttar Pradesh debt waiver scheme
To understand how potential beneficiary households respond to repeated waiver programs, we evaluated the UP Rin Maafi Yojana (UPRMY) announced in recent research (Chakraborty and Gupta 2017). Under UPRMY, a household qualified for a waiver based on the amount of loan borrowed and repaid. A timeline of the roll out of the waiver program can be seen in Figure 1.
 

Figure 1: Map depicting phased implementation of the UPRMY
Under the UPRMY, approximately Rs 1700 crore was disbursed as debt relief covering approximately 7.3 lakh farmers from 74 districts. The program was rolled in a phased manner over a period of three years from 2012-2015. About 42 districts received the relief package in 2012-13. In 28 districts, the program roll out happened in 2013-14. The remaining four districts received the waiver in 2014-15. Figure 2 tells an interesting story. Irrespective of which district received the waiver in which year, repayment rates fell dramatically right after the announcement of the waiver program, across all districts of UP. The average rate fell from 25%-50% in 2010-11 (pre-announcement) to 10%-25% in 2011-12 (post-announcement).

Consumption and investment behaviour of eligible vs. non-eligible households
We analyse the change in household behavior following the UPRMY using primary data collected in 2015 from 5,270 individuals in 770 households across six districts of UP. The districts were chosen to include regions from different phases of the program roll-out. Auraiya and Kanpur Dehat received the waiver in 2012-13. Agra and Firozabad received the waiver in 2013-14. We also include Lakhimpur, the only district that did not receive the waiver at the time of data collection and Sitapur, which received the waiver in 2012-13 and is adjacent to Lakhimpur. In each district a household qualifies for loan waiver if it had borrowed an agricultural loan of up to Rs 50,000 from the UP Gramin Vikas Bank. Further, the household was required to have repaid at least 10% of the borrowed amount on or before the programme announcement date.
Table 1: Household Behaviour In Response to UPRMY

Variable Received Loan Waiver Not- Received Loan Waiver
Consumption 41479 32728
Productivity 29397 38690
Income 52623 59051

Note: Consumption, is the yearly consumption expenditure in rupees; Income, is the annual income of a household; Productivity refers to the value of total production over farm size.
The average consumption value of households that received the loan waiver is roughly Rs 41,000, much higher than those of households who did not receive the waiver. This is in spite of the fact that the households that did not receive the loan waiver had a higher income and a higher level of agricultural productivity.
We delve deeper in to this apparent evidence of moral hazard using more rigorous statistical techniques. We compare differences in consumption and investment decisions between potentially eligible and not eligible households in districts that received the waiver vis-à-vis the differences between potentially eligible and not eligible households in districts that did not receive the waiver.
Our findings suggest that eligible households in districts that received the waiver had higher consumption expenditure, approximately by Rs 8,000 per year, as compared to non-eligible households. What is of greater concern is that eligible households also tend to spend significantly more on social events such as weddings, family occasions and so on. In addition, we find that eligible households had no significant productivity gain as a result of receiving the debt waiver compared to non-eligible households. Given that households in the same districts face similar agricultural shocks the insignificant productivity difference between eligible and not-eligible groups suggests a failure of the program to achieve its desired goals.
Rethinking policy interventions
Eligibility of households for loan waiver frees them up from debts and builds expectations of future credit availability. Consequently, the need to arrange for debt repayment falls. In other words, our results indicate, repeated debt waiver program have led to willful defaults. Farmers borrow from banks for agricultural investment but do not undertake the investment. Instead they use up the loan for consumption and are unable to repay the debt in the future. These findings, coupled with Figure 2 suggest that blanket waiver schemes lead households to stop repaying debts irrespective of their waiver eligibility status. This could be detrimental for the financial sustainability of this line of policy. It is important to note, however, that our findings do not speak against loan waiver programs altogether. Rather they warn against implementation of loan waiver programs based on simplistic eligibility rules that do not account for the actual needs of the farmers and the agricultural shocks they have faced. The agricultural sector in India is still vastly affected by scanty rainfall, poor irrigation facility and loans from private moneylenders with high rates of interest. A majority of the defaults could be a genuine disability to pay back due any of these reasons. However, a more thorough understanding is required regarding the effectiveness of different interventions. An alternate policy to explore is agricultural insurance which has seen an extremely low take up rate from farmers so far.
Tanika Chakraborty is assistant professor of Economics at the Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta, on leave from Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur. Aarti Gupta, an angel investor by profession, has a Phd in Economics from IIT Kanpur, with her doctoral thesis on Loan Waivers in India.

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